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CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW AND THE FAMILY
By EDwARD A. HoGAN, JR.
Vice Dean, University of California, Hastings College of Law, San Francisco
Less than one hundred years separate two great sages of American law.
The interval represents a period of rapid growth in science, industry,
economics, politics and national strength. The body of law with which each
man has worked so ably has not been subject to comparable change. Prin-
ciples of law, discovered chiefly by reason in the time of Lemuel Quincy
Shaw, were fortified by authorities, in the time of Roscoe Pound. Law, as a
product of reason, remains intact.
It may be intellectually profitable to use techniques of evaluation
employed by Dean Pound on the decisions of Chief Justice Shaw. Taking a
standard classification of the law during a fixed period of time, it is possible
thus to evaluate the ratio dicedendi of Shaw. Decisions, affecting the family
as a unit of society, made during his first ten years on the bench, will be the
subject of this inquiry.
Pound's Theory of Interests
When the greatest of America's legal scholars was asked to present his
philosophy of law, Roscoe Pound said:
"I think of law as in one sense a highly specialized form of social control
in a developed politically organized society-a social control through the
systematic and orderly application of the force of such society.' . . . What
we are seeking to do and must do in a civilized society is to adjust relations
and order conduct in a world in which the goods of existence, the scope of
free activity, and the objects on which to exert free activity are limited, and
the demands upon these goods and those objects are infinite. . . Today, in
my judgment, the most important problem which confronts the jurist is the
theory of interests. A legal system attains the ends of the legal order (1) by
recognizing certain interests, individual, 2 public, and social; 3 (2) by defining
'Pound, "My Philosophy of Law," Credos of Sixteen American Scholars 249, published under
the direction of the Julius Rosenthal Foundation, Northwestern University (1941).
'Pound, "Interests of Personality," 28 Harvard Law Review, 343, 349 (1915): "Individual
interests may be classified as (a) interests of personality,-the individual physical and spiritual
existence; (b) domestic interests,-'the expanded individual life'; and (c) interests of substance-
the individual economic life."
Ibid., 351 (quoting from Spencer's "Scheme of Natural Rights"):
"1. The right to physical integrity.
"2. The right to free motion and locomotion.
"3. The right to the use of natural media (air, running water, the sea, etc.).
"4. The right of property.
"5. The right of free exchange and free contract.
"6. The right of free industry (a right of economic motion and locomotion).
"7. The right of free belief and opinion (free mental motion)."
'Ibid, 344: "Strictly, the concern of the law is with social interests, since it is the social
interest in securing the individual interest that must determine the law to secure it. But using
(10)
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the limits within which these interests shall be recognized legally and given
effect through legal precepts; and (3) by endeavoring to secure the interests
so recognized within the defined limits. I should define an interest, for the
present purpose, as a demand or desire which human beings either indi-
vidually or in groups or in associations or in relations, seek to satisfy, of
which, therefore, the ordering of human relations must take account. . . .
Hence, in determining the scope and subject matter of the legal system we
have to consider five things: (1) we must take an inventory of the interests
which press for recognition and must generalize them and classify them;
(2) we must select and determine the interests which the law should recognize
and seek to secure; (3) we must fix the limits of securing the interest so
selected-; . . . (4) we must consider the means by which the law may
secure interests when recognized and delimited, . . . (5) in order to do
these things we must work out principles of valuation of interests."
Shaw's Decisions
Marriage
Lawyers have assumed, without question, that marriage is the moral
foundation of family life. An inventory of some interests involved in mar-
riage are these. The individual interest in free contract and in free belief
and opinion competes with the social interest in the stability of marriage as
a social institution. The church, as a state agency, may offer competition
by way of a public interest in good order and discipline. Chief Justice Shaw
was called upon to reconcile these competing interests in an action of debt
for fifty pounds brought against a minister for performing a marriage con-
trary to the proyisions of Stats. 1786, c. 3, sec. 5:
"The first section of the Act gave authority to an ordained minister of
the Gospel to marry in the town, district, parish or plantation where he
resides. By an additional Statute, 1820, c. 55 1, the authority was extended
and every stated and ordained minister was authorized to solemnize marriages
when one or both of the persons to be married belonged to the parish or
congregation of such minister, although such person or persons shall reside
without the limits of such town, parish, or district, and such marriages may
be solemnized, either within the town, parish, or district, where such minister
resides, or wherein such person or persons may reside."
interest to mean a claim which a human being or a group of human beings may make, it is con-
venient to speak of individual interests, public interests,-that is, interests of the state as a juristic
person,-and social interests,-that is, interests of the community at large. This is the order in
which they have been recognized in the development of juristic thought."
Ibid., 345: "Yet the social interest in general security was the first interest secured by the law.
It is not too much to say that the law came into being to secure this interest."
"Leavitt v. Truair, 13 Pick. 111 (1832) : "The Marriage Act of 1786 provided that if any Justice
of the Peace or minister shall, otherwise than is expressly allowed and authorized by this Act, join
any persons in marriage, they shall severally forfeit and pay the sum of fifty pounds."
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The minister defendant contended that he was justified in performing
the marriage in that the bridegroom had become a member of his parish and
the ceremony was performed at the residence of the bridegroom in the town
of Conway. The church over which the minister presided was in the town
of Westhampton. The case turned on the question of whether or not the
bridegroom was a member of the defendant's parish. Chief Justice Shaw
pointed out that membership in a church comes about through agreement of
the parties. The bridegroom had asked for membership in the minister's
parish and he had been accepted as a member. However, following the old
law of the Commonwealth, the bridegroom was by law a member of the
parish in which he resided. A right was given by the Statute of 1811, c. 6,
commonly called the Religious Freedom Act, for a man to change his member-
ship in the church. The bridegroom had not filed a certificate of membership
in the new parish with the clerk of the old parish. This difficulty was taken
care of by the Chief Justice in this language:
"Both of these statutes seem to presuppose that a religious society may
be formed, before it is organized, and that a person shall have joined himself
to, and become a member of one religious society, before he can claim exemp-
tion from taxation in another. It would seem to follow, as a necessary
consequence, that a man may belong to, and for some purposes must be a
member of two religious societies at the same time. He must become a mem-
ber of the new one before he can obtain his certificate; and he does not cease
to be a member of the old, for the purpose of taxation, until he has filed his
certificate there, between which two periods there must be some, and may be
a long interval of time, during which he belongs to both. . . .We are of
opinion, that filing the certificate with the clerk of the society in Conway,
was not necessary to give effect to this act of mutual agreement, by which he
became a member of the defendant's society, within the meaning of the
statute, and that the defendant incurred no penalty, by officiating at his mar-
riage in the town of Conway. ... We decide only, that having become a mem-
ber of the society, and obtained a certificate, he belongs to that society, so
that the minister of it may lawfully marry him, in the same or another town,
though he has not filed such certificate with the clerk of the society he left."5
Thus, the interest of the individual to marry, to exercise his free religious
belief, and the social interests of the community at large were satisfied by
the decision that the marriage was accomplished according to rules of good
order and certainty, and the public interest of the state, in the proper perform-
ance of the duties of its agents, was vindicated.
The individual interest of free belief was asserted frequently during the
ten-year period of the Chief Justice's decisions. The foundation for the deci-
sion in Leavitt v. Truair, supra, was laid in two earlier cases.
'Ibid., 13 Pick. 112 (1832).
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In an action of trover for tankards and other articles of church furniture
brought by the deacon of a church in Brookfield against another who claimed
to be deacon of the same church, the court was called upon to decide which
was affiliated with the true church.6 A statute of 1786 provided that donations
of property, made to churches, shall vest in the deacons thereof. It was agreed
that the property belonged to "The Church in the Third Precinct of Brook-
field." Mr. Stone was the settled minister of the church. Some of the parish-
ioners and Mr. Stone formed themselves into another religious group, under
the name of "The Evangelical Religious Society in the South Parish." Some
of the members of the old society remained steadfast in their beliefs and
settled a Reverend Mr. Noyes as the minister. The present plaintiff repre-
sented the Noyes Society and the defendant, the Stone Society. To solve the
problem it became necessary to do the difficult job of distinguishing the
church from the congregation.
Says Chief Justice Shaw:7
"The church is composed of those persons, being members of such parish
or religious society, who unite themselves together for the purpose of cele-
brating the Lord's Supper. They may avail themselves of their union and
association, for other purposes of mutual support and edification in piety
and morality, or otherwise, according to such terms of church covenant as
they think it expedient to adopt. But such other purposes are not essential
to their existence and character as a church. Such is the general definition
of a church.
". .. So with regard to the church and congregation, they may, though
they rarely are, be composed of the same individuals; in which case, the same
body may be regarded in two distinct capacities. To illustrate this, suppose
ten young married men procure from the Government the grant of a town-
ship of land, and settle upon it, get incorporated as a town, and settle a
minister, all with their wives being members of the church in full Communion.
Here the town, parish and church are all composed of the same individuals.
They are, however, to be regarded as three distinct bodies, for different pur-
poses known to the law, or, what is in effect the same thing, a body with three
distinct capacities. In this state of things, property is given to this body, by
any designation sufficient to identify it, by one person to procure a service
of church plate, by another to support a teacher of piety, religion, and
morality, and by another to support a school. The year after, several persons
move into the town, become proprietors of lands and houses, by purchase and
lease, and as such, settled inhabitants, but who are not church members. They
attend public worship, and are assessed for their polls and estates, to the
parish tax. Here the distinction, between church and parish, which all along
existed in contemplation of law, becomes manifest and takes effect in practice.
Those only who are church members, will constitute the church; and all prop-
erty that had been given to the original body, which by the express terms of
'Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 171 (1830).
'Ibid., 182,184, 193.
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the grant was limited to the use, or given in trust for the church, or which,
from its nature, the law will presume to have been so intended, vests de facto
in those who, by law, are constituted a corporation to take property for the
use and benefit of the church. In the case supposed, the service of plate,
whether given to the church or parish, or both, by whatever designation, as
it could only have been designed to be used in the celebration of the Christian
ordinances, would by law vest in the deacons, the law implying from the
nature of the property, that such was the trust intended by the donor. All
other property would remain vested in the town, in its municipal or parochial
capacity.
". .. That considering a church, gathered in a religious society, in the
sense in which it is used, and in which alone it can be used, in this relation,
it seems to follow conclusively, from the principles already stated, that when
a minister ceases to be the teacher of piety, religion, and morality in such a
society, he ceases to be the pastor of such church."
Speaking of the Stone group, the Chief Justice said that, "as a church,
they had voted, as far as they were capable of doing so, in that capacity, to
unite with the Evangelical Society, and thus, if a church at all, had become
a separate and distinct church from that of the Third Precinct.
". .. It further appears, that the body represented by the plaintiff is
composed in part of those who were, before any division, members of the
church of that parish, with others regularly chosen by them, that they are
associated for the celebration of Christian ordinances, in the usual church
form and order, that they have been recognized as a regular church by an
ecclesiastical council, and joined in the call of settlement of a minister in
that parish, and therefore, possess all the requisites and characteristics of the
church of that parish."
Thus was reconciled the conflict of the individual interest of free belief
and the social interest in the continuity of a church. The identification of the
church with the marriage ceremony was close.
The social interest in the attachment of every person to a church and
the public interest in the collection of taxes for the support of the church
when there was no individual interest of free belief brought Shaw to a deci-
sion which it is difficult to explain. Perhaps it may be attributed to the
peculiar thinking of the time and place8
"Real estate belonging to a manufacturing corporation and situated
within a territorial parish, the same being the oldest religious society in the
town, was assessed in the taxes of such parish. An argument was made on
behalf of the corporation based on the Statute of 1823, c. 106, § 3, which
provided that no citizen of this Commonwealth, being a member of any
religious society in this Commonwealth, shall be liable to pay any tax for
parochial charges to any religious society other than to that of which he
is a member.
sGoodell Mfg. Co. v. Trask, 11 Pick. 513 (1831).
Ibid., 518: The legislature, by Revised Statutes, c. 20, see. 20, corrected the error by which
a corporation was made liable for a church tax.
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". .. The opinion of the court then is, that by the construction of the
Statute of 1786, all real estate lying within the limits of a territorial parish
is liable to be assessed, that the Statute of 1823 changes this law only when
such real estate is held by a citizen of the state, who is a member of some
other religious society, in which case it is to be assessed in such other religious
society; that the real estate of a corporation, although its members are mem-
bers of some other religious society is not liable to be assessed as to property
of such members, in such other religious societies, and, therefore, it is liable
to be assessed in the territorial parish within the limits of which it is situated."
Domicile
The conflict between the individual interest in free locomotion and the
public interest in the collection of taxes was reconciled successfully in two
cases. The general problem involved is the right of the head of the family
to change the family domicile. A Bostonian moved with his family to Edin-
burgh, but the Collector of Taxes assessed him as a Bostonian. Says Shaw:9
"In reference to this evidence, the jury were instructed, that if they were
satisfied that the plaintiff went abroad, not for the mere purpose of traveling,
or for any particular object, intending to return when that was accom-
plished, but with the intention of remaining abroad for an indefinite length of
time, or with the intention of not returning to Boston to live, in the event of
his return to the United States, then he ceased to be an inhabitant of Boston,
liable to taxation.
"We think this direction, in connection with the subject matter to which
it applied, was correct. The actual change of one's residence, with his family,
and the taking up of a residence elsewhere, without any intention of return-
ing, is one of the strong indications of change of domicile, and, unless con-
trolled by other circumstances, is decisive. It was for the jury to determine
whether there were any circumstances sufficient to control such conclusion.
If the plaintiff had left Boston and actually taken up a residence, with his
family in Scotland, without any intention of returning, thereby assuming
that country as his definite abode and place of residence until some new inten-
tion had been formed, a resolution taken, he had ceased to be an inhabitant
.of Boston, liable to taxation for his personal property."
An opposite result on the same rule of law, the facts being found to be
different, was reached in Sears v. Boston:"0
"In the present case, there was, at the time of the departure of the plain-
tiff from Boston, an intention to return and resume his residence in Boston,
though at no fixed period, accompanied with circumstances indicating a
temporary and not a permanent residence in Paris. The court are, therefore,
of opinion that the plaintiff continued to be an inhabitant of Boston, liable
by law to taxation, and that he is not entitled to recover back the money paid
as a tax upon his person and his personal property."
'Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Mete. 242, 246 (1840).
101 Metc. 250, 253 (1840).
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Wife
The disability of a wife to contract, founded no doubt in the social
interest in preventing marital discord, presented a serious conflict with
another's interest in free contract. A wife promised to pay for support and
necessaries furnished to her during the time in which her husband was non
compos. The promise was not binding upon her or her estate:"
"Nor is a Jeme covert liable on her express promise, for her support.
This rule necessarily results from the principle, that the husband and wife are
one person in law, and her ability to bind herself by express contracts is
necessarily suspended. The cases in which a wife has been held liable as a
leme sole on her own promise, made when living apart from her husband by
mutual agreement, and having a separate maintenance, have not been adopted
here; but were it otherwise, the principle of those cases would not affect the
present case, there being no separation by mutual agreement, and no separate
maintenance provided for the wife.
". .. If no action would lie against the intestate in her lifetime, none
will lie against her administrator. The circumstance, that the wife had a
reversionary interest in real estate, which may now, by aid of the statute, be
made assets for the payment of her debts, we think, cannot affect the question
whether she did contract the debt, by receiving support and maintenance
from her daughter. If the fact were proved, that the husband was non cornpos,
any part or the whole of the time in question, we think it would make no
difference, because it would not remove the disability of the wife, or confer
on her any new power to bind herself by contract. The law would still raise
an implied promise against the husband, for necessaries."
The social interest in exemptions from contractual obligations, granted
by the state, survived the complications of marriage of the debtor to a
husband, who by common law, became liable for the wife's premarital debts.
Chief Justice Shaw delivered the opinion of the court: 2
"This is a joint action against the defendants as husband and wife to
charge the husband with the debt of the wife contracted before the marriage,
in the State of Rhode Island, where she then resided. The defense, not denying
that the debt was contracted as charged, is placed upon the ground, that
prior to the marriage, the female defendant, took the benefit of the insolvent
law of the State of Rhode Island, where both she and the plaintiffs then
resided, and thereby obtained a qualified discharge, and that one of the effects
of that discharge was, to exempt any husband she should marry, from the
liability for her debts, which otherwise, by the principles of the common law,
would devolve on him by the marriage. . . . In applying the doctrine of
lex loci contractus to obligations resulting from marriage, I would confine
it (which is all that is necessary for the purposes of this action) to civil rights
of property, which may be differently regulated by the positive laws of differ-
ent communities.
"Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 199 (1834).
"Pitkin v. Thompson, 13 Pick. 64 (1832).
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"It may well be admitted, consistently with this principle, that "there are
certain duties and obligations arising out of the contract of marriage, and
out of the relation thereby established, which are of general, continuing, and
lasting obligation, recognized at least in all Christian communities, to which
the laws of every community will attach, when the married parties, in good
faith and with a sincere and honest purpose to change their domicile, come to
reside within its jurisdiction.
"These rights and obligations are incident to the very nature and sub-
sistence of the conjugal relation. But superadded to these there may exist very
different rules and legal provisions, established by the positive municipal laws,
in regard to the rights of property, which shall attach to the relation of hus-
band and wife.
"The rule of the common law that upon the marriage all the personal
property of the wife shall de facto vest in the husband, and the correlative
principle, that the husband shall de facto become responsible for the debts of
the wife, are of this character. . . . And there seems to be no reason why
communities, governed generally by the rules of the common law, but enjoy-
ing full powers of legislation, may not alter these principles in whole or in
part, to suit their own views of the best interests of their citizens.
". .. The plaintiffs can show no promise, or express act or undertaking
of the husband, by which he has engaged to pay this debt of the wife. They
rely upon the obligation implied by law, from the husband's responsibility.
In setting this out in a declaration, they must allege, after stating the facts
creating the debt on the part of the wife dum sola, that the husband became
liable in law to pay, and in consideration of such liability, promise. Without
the legal liability, there is no promise or obligation. . . It follows, then,
that upon the marriage, in the State of Rhode Island, contrary to the general
rule of the common law, the husband, by force of the statute, was exempt and
not liable for those debts of the wife of which he had been sub modo dis-
charged, and of which that sued for in this action is one."
A social interest in encouragement to marriage may well have been an
important factor in leading to the 6onclusion that a feme covert ought not to
be more of an economic burden than a feme sole. The individual interest of
the creditor in the payment of a debt is subordinated to one or the other of
the social interests stated.
Children
The social interest in fair dealings with children prevailed over the
individual interest of free contract in several cases. It was held to be improper
for a master cooper to send his apprentice abroad on a whaling voyage and
to take the earnings of the apprentice for such voyage:"
"It has been repeatedly decided, that in the contract of apprenticeship,
whether made by the minor himself, in the cases allowed by law, or by his
parent or guardian, or by persons clothed with public authority, a special
regard shall be presumed to have been had to the personal character, capacity
"Randall v. Rotcl, 12 Pick. 106 (1831).
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and qualifications of the master. He is, for the time being, and for a consider-
able period of time, a most important one to the development of the character
of the apprentice, to stand in loco parentis. A high trust and confidence are
reposed in the person of the master. All the considerations which go to
support the rule that an apprentice cannot be assigned over, are arguments
against the right of the master to place the apprentice out of his own control
and instruction, for the long period of a whaling voyage, averaging from
two to four years, a large portion of the usual period of apprenticeship. It is
directly repugnant to the leading stipulation on the part of the master, to
instruct the apprentice in his trade."
A slight variation on the facts brings out with greater emphasis, the
judicial assertion of the social interest. A contract of apprenticeship included
within its terms the right to ship on a whaling vessel with the earnings of
the apprentice to go to the master. It was held that the contract, not being
reasonable and beneficial to the minor, the minor was entitled to recover the
earnings for his own use. 4
"The court do not mean to say, that it is not competent for a minor,
over fourteen years of age, with the consent of his parents, and under many
circumstances by himself alone, to make a contract for his employment; and
if such contract is reasonable and beneficial to the minor, it may be held to
be valid and binding in law, on the ground that it is within a well-known
exception to the general rule, under which minors are held incompetent to
bind themselves by their contracts. But in all such cases the question will be,
whether the particular contract, at the time and under the circumstances under
which it was made, and in the stipulations and provisions of the contract
itself, was reasonable and beneficial to the minor, then the contract will be
supported or vacated accordingly."
A similar contract, considered more beneficial to the minor, was upheld.
Father and son agreed with the master that the son was to be released from
his apprenticeship in order to permit the son to go on a whaling voyage. It
was agreed also that the son was to be permitted to retain for his own use as
much of the earnings as were available to him. It was held that the minor's
earnings on the voyage were not liable to be attached on a trustee process
sued out by a creditor of the father.' 5
"The general principle is, that a father is entitled to his minor son's
earnings, unless he has been emancipated; but if the son does in fact act and
make contracts for himself with the knowledge of the father, this is evidence
of his consent to permit his son to contract for his employment and take his
own earnings; and where such consent has been given, neither the father
himself, nor his creditors, can interpose after the wages in such an employ-
ment have been earned, to take the amount from the son."
A minor who makes a contract, with the approval of his guardian, to
"Nickerson v. Easton, 12 Pick. 110 (1831).
" Manchester v. Smith, 12 Pick. 113 (1831).
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work for his support until he is 21, was not allowed to disaffirm and bring
an action for quantum meruit, because he felt that his work was worth more.
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"And it appears to the court, taking into consideration the age of the
minor when the contract was made, and the circumstances attending it, that
it was reasonable and beneficial. It is to be considered, that the employer
took upon himself the risk of the health, life, and probably mental capacity
of the plaintiff to labor. Had he been sick or otherwise incapable of perform-
ing any labor, the defendant was nevertheless, by the terms of his contract,
bound to support him. These considerations may render the contract equal
and beneficial at the time, although in the event, which could not then be fore-
seen, the plaintiff's labor may have been of greater value than the subsistence
and education which he obtained as an equivalent. The circumstance also,
that the contract was made with the consent and approbation of the guardian,
evinced by his becoming a party to it, so strongly showed that the contract
was entered into deliberately and with a just regard to the rights and security
of the minor. And it would be injurious rather than beneficial to minors, to
hold that a contract thus made is of no legal force and effect."
The last logical link in this chain of reasoning was forged in Corey v.
Corey,"7 where a minor son, authorized by his father to seek employment,
was permitted to maintain an action for wages against his employer.
An example, quite timely today, of the priority given to the social
interest in family life over the public interest in maintaining a military force,
will be found in Commonwealth v. Downes:'s
"But where there is a father claiming the custody of his child, his right
is paramount to that of the son, to make contracts for his own employment,
without regard to the consideration, whether such contracts, if performed,
would be beneficial to the minor or not. This right, in the case of an orphan,
is transferred to the guardian, if there be one.
"This right of the father or guardian to have the custody of the minor
child, and under his general authority, the right to control and regulate his
education, his employment, his place of residence and occupation, is a most
important and valuable one, a right essential to the maintenance of parental
authority, and one on which the advancement of good education and the
promotion of social order and good government, do very greatly depend.
The mild but firm and steady discipline of a well-regulated family, is probably
the most effectual training, for making good citizens, fitted for all the exig-
encies of a free and enlightened government. If, at the sound of the drum
and fife, and the display of the flag of the recruiting officer, all the boys of
the city or village, of whatever age, could quit the parental roof, and without
the consent, and against the remonstrances of their parents and guardians,
could enlist for the Navy and march off, and such a proceeding was sanc-
tioned by law in time of peace, or when no extraordinary exigency
exists, it would lead to a state of society much like anarchy. It is not neces-
"Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick. 1 (1832).
1"19 Pick. 29 (1837).
1524 Pick. 227 (1836).
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sary to decide, that Congress has not the power, under their authority to
raise Navies and Armies, and in the discharge of their duty to provide for
the defence of their country, to resort to these extraordinary means."
This was an habeas corpus directed to an officer of the United States
Navy for the release of a minor, enlisted without the consent of his legal
guardian. The writ was granted.
The writ of habeas corpus was used on two other occasions to protect
the social interest in the integrity of the family. A wife, without cause, left
her husband and carried off their child. The husband regained custody of
the child by means of the writ:1 9
"Upon the first application for this writ a doubt was entertained, whether
the writ could properly be issued against a wife on the application of the
husband. This doubt originated in the well-known rule, that there can be no
adverse interest between husband and wife, but that in contemplation of law,
the custody of both wife and child belongs to the husband and father, and
is actually in him. But on consideration, the writ being in the name of the
Commonwealth, the technical objection of a suit between husband and wife,
is avoided; and in as much as the writ is designed to secure and promote
personal liberty, slight objections ought not to be entertained. The process
may be often useful and highly beneficial, as the only efficient and peaceful
remedy for a husband to obtain the custody of his child, when he is entitled
to it. The court, therefore, are of opinion, that a writ of habeas corpus might
issue to a wife at the instance of her husband. . . .They were of opinion,
that unless there is some justifiable cause of separation, the court ought not
to sanction the unauthorized separation of husband and wife, by ordering
the child into the custody of the mother, thus separated and out of the custody
of the father. If there be any good cause of divorce, either a vinculo or
a mensa, and proceedings are instituted, the court will then take such order,
as to the custody both of the wife and children, as the circumstances of the
case may require."
The child of a slave, in the state of Louisiana, who could not be con-
sidered to belong to her parent by the laws of that place, was brought into
the Commonwealth as the personal attendant of the owner. The social interest
in the freedom of the person was brought in conflict with the interest of the
individual to hold property. The valuation of interests in the two states
being completely different, the question was presented whether the forum
where the subject in controversy was located could make an evaluation of
interests which would divest ownership recognized by the law of the other
state. The policy of the locus in quo was vindicated on a writ of habeas
corpus.
2 °
"The conclusion to which we come .. .
"That by the general and now well-established law of this Common-
wealth, bond slavery cannot exist, because it is contrary to natural right, and
"0 Comm. v. Briggs, 16 Pick. 203 (1834).
"'Comm. v. Ares, 18 Pick. 193 (1836).
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repugnant to numerous provisions of the Constitution of laws, designed to
secure the liberty and personal rights of all persons within its limits and
entitled to the protection of the laws.
"That though by the laws of a foreign state, meaning by 'foreign,' in
this connection a state governed by its own laws, and between which and our
own there is no dependence one upon the other, but which in this respect are
as independent as foreign states, a person may acquire a property in a slave,
such acquisition, being contrary to natural right, and effected by the local
law, is dependent upon such local law for its existence and efficacy, and being
contrary to the fundamental laws of this state, such general right of property
cannot be exercised or recognized here.
"That, as a general rule, all persons coming within the limits of the state,
become subject to all its municipal laws, civil and criminal, and entitled to the
privileges which those laws confer; that this rule applies as well to blacks
as whites, except in the case of fugitives, to be afterwards considered; that if
such persons have been slaves, they become free, not so much because any
alteration is made in their status, or condition, as because there is no law
which will warrant, but there are laws, if they choose to avail themselves of
them, which prohibit, their forceable detention or their forceable removal."
Widow and Heir
The social interest in the preservation of the family presented some diffi-
cult problems in competition with the individual interest of the wife in matri-
monial property. On the death of the husband, the social policy in favor of
support of the widow was strong but the policy in favor of subsidy of the
heirs was stronger. The claims of the individuals, widow versus heir, appar-
ently are reconciled by the social considerations which favor the heir. The
right to firewood to be taken from the land of the deceased is given to the
widow for life, as part of her dower estate, to satisfy her personal needs,
but if she takes more she will be charged with waste of the property of the
reversioners."
"But the right of the widow thus acquired is that of reasonable estovers,
under which may be included firebote for the necessary fuel for the supply
of the dower estate. But this right of reasonable estovers is confined strictly
to wood and timber sufficient for the supply of the estate, and it must be
actually applied, used and consumed upon the estate, or for purposes con-
nected with its proper use, occupation, and enjoyment. It has been recently
decided, that cutting growing trees, to be exchanged for other wood to be
used as fuel or timber on the estate, was not within the right of a tenant in
dower, but in law was deemed waste."
The social policy in favor of the subsidy of heirs collectively, instead
of particular heirs, was made clear in the case of the posthumous child:22
". .. Where a gift was to children born, etc., a child en ventre sa mere
should take a share. Among other considerations it was suggested, that a
21White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248 (1835).
"Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick. 255 (1834).
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child en ventre sa mere, even in the early stages of pregnancy, should be
deemed living, because the potential existence of such child places it within
the reason and motive of the gift. . . . A child en ventre sa mere is taken to
be a person in being, for many purposes. He may take by descent; by devise;
or under the statute of distributions; and generally for all purposes where it
is for his benefit."
The social interest which favors children on inheritance loses some of
its force when put in competition with a contract claim of an adult daughter
for compensation for taking care of the father's household. A strict require-
ment that she prove the existence of a contract, with no presumptions in her
favor, was asserted in Guild v. Guild. Chief Justice Shaw spoke for an equally
divided court, which did not upset a jury verdict favoring the claim of the
daughter:23
"Other members of the court are of opinion (confining the opinion to
the case of daughters, and expressing no opinion as to the case of sons,
laboring on the farm or otherwise in the service of a father), that the pro-
longed residence of a daughter in her father's family after twenty-one, per-
forming her share in the ordinary labors of the family, and receiving the
protection and supplies contemplated in the supposed case, may well be
accounted for, upon considerations of mutual kindness and good-will, and
mutual comfort and convenience, without presuming that there was any
understanding, or any expectation, that pecuniary compensation was to be
made; that proof of these facts alone, therefore, does not raise an implied
promise to make any pecuniary compensation for such services, or throw on
the defendant the burden of proof to show, affirmatively, that the daughter
performed the services gratuitously, and without any expectation of receiving
wages or pecuniary compensation, that with a view to the share she might
hope to receive in her father's estate or otherwise."
Divorce
The social interest in perpetuating matrimony was stronger, in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, than the individual interest in free loco-
motion and its correlative opportunity for easy divorce. A wife left her
husband in New York, which was conceded to be the matrimonial domicile,
and returned to the home of her mother in Massachusetts, where she filed suit
for divorce. The grounds alleged for a decree a vinculo were adultery, cruelty
and desertion. Neither cruelty nor desertion was grounds for divorce in New
York. Although Massachusetts had been the matrimonial domicile in earlier
years, the court refused to take jurisdiction. Said Chief Justice Shaw:2 4
"The ground of defense to this libel is, that the parties were not within
the jurisdiction nor limits, nor subject to the laws of the Commonwealth, at
the time of the act done, which is relied on as the cause of divorce. .-. .
2315 Pick. 129 (1833).
"Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181 (1833).
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"But where the parties have bona fide renounced their domicile in this
state, though married here, and taken up a domicile in another state, and
there lived as man and wife, and an act is done by one, which if done in this
state, would entitle the other to a divorce, and one of the parties comes into
this state, the courts of this Commonwealth have not such jurisdiction of the
parties, and of their relation as husband and wife, as to warrant them in
saying, that the marriage should be dissolved. The case of Barber v. Root, is
an authority for saying, that such a divorce would not be valid in New York.
"It is of importance that such a question should be regulated, if possible,
not by local law or local usage, under which the marriage relation should be
deemed subsisting in one state and dissolved in another; but upon some
general principle, which can be recognized in all states and countries, so that
the parties who are deemed husband and wife in one, shall be held so in all.
"So many interesting relations, so many collateral and derivative rights
of property, and of inheritance, so many correlative duties depend upon the
subsistence of this relation, that it is scarcely possible to overrate the impor-
tance of placing it upon some general and uniform principle, which shall be
recognized and adopted in all civilized states.
"It appearing that the alleged desertion woulcS be no ground for divorce,
by the laws of the State of New York, that at the time of the alleged desertion,
the parties had their home in that state and were not subject to the law and
jurisdiction of this Commonwealth, and that when the suit was instituted,
the respondent still had his domicile in the State of New York, the court are
of opinion, that a divorce a mensa, cannot be decreed, and that the libel be
dismissed."
By insisting upon actual matrimonial domicile as the basis of jusidiction
for divorce, the Chief Justice probably adopted a formula which was intended
to discourage flight from matrimony into easy divorce. The decision shows
that he was not unaware that flight from matrimony could be used equally
as well to prevent divorce, when justified. By way of dicta; he said:25
"... Where parties have bona fide taken up a domicile in this Com-
monwealth and have resided under the protection and subject to the control
of our laws, and during the continuance of such domicile, one does an act,
which may entitle the other to a divorce, such divorce shall be granted, and
the suit for it entertained, although the act was done out of the jurisdiction,
and whether the act be a crime which would subject the party to punishment
or not; but after such right has accrued, it cannot be defeated, either by the
actual absence of the other party, however long continued animo revertendi,
or by a colorable change of domicile, or even by an actual change of domi-
cile; and that it shall not be considered in law, that the change of domicile
of the husband draws after it the domicile of the wife to another state, so as
to oust the courts of this state of their jurisdiction, and deprive the injured
wife of the protection of the laws of this Commonwealth and of her own
right to a divorce.
"This suggests another course of inquiry, that is, how far the maxim
"5Ibid., 14 Pick. 181, 186 (1833).
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is applicable to this case, 'that the domicile of the wife follows that of the
husband.' . . . It is probably a juster view, to consider that the maxim is
founded upon the theoretic identity of person, and of interest, between hus-
band and wife, as established by law, and the presumption, that from the
nature of that relation, the home of the one is that of the other, and intended
to promote, strengthen, and secure their interest in this relation, as it ordi-
narily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the law will recognize
a wife, as having a separate existence, and separate interests, and separate
rights, in those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show,
that the relation itself ought to be dissolved, or so modified as to establish
separate interests, and especially, a separate domicile and home, bed and
board being put, apart for the whole, as expressive of the idea of home. Other-
wise, the parties in this respect would stand upon very unequal grounds, it
being in the power of the husband to change his domicile at will, but not in
that of the wife."
Conclusion
The law, administered by Chief Justice Shaw, represented a specialized
form of social control in a developed, politically organized society. This
social control was not based upon an inflexible set of rules which a judge
was expected to administer in a purely mechanical fashion. For many of
his decisions, there were no rules or precedents which he could apply. For
those cases where there were precedents, the judge was free to evaluate them
before application and to reject them, if they appeared to be in conflict with
the needs of the time and place.
The duty of the judge was the duty of reasonable decision. The ingredi-
ents of a reasonable decision seem to be the same for Shaw and for Pound.
The social interest in the general security found its way into the evaluation
of each case. The individual interest in freedom of thought, action, contract
and industry was weighed. The public interest of the state as a juristic person
was not overemphasized or neglected.
The individual interest to marry was weighed against the social interest
in security and certainty by the use of recognized forms and procedures.
The social interest of the time and place in the maintenance of religious
institutions was subject to some regulation in the individual interest in free-
dom of belief. The right to dissent from the beliefs of the state church did
not permit an exemption from the obligation to support some church. The
social interest in minimizing matrimonial quarrels by declaring the husband
the head of the family was weighed against the individual interest of the
wife to separate property. The social interest in family discipline outweighed
the individual interest of a child in free contract and the public interest in
maintaining the soldiery. Many of the social interests of his time and place
are not the interests of our civilization.
Chief Justice Shaw fortunately enjoys an excellent reputation as a judge.
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Time alone insures that his reputation is founded upon the quality of his
work-his charm, politics or intrigue are placed beyond our knowledge.
Thus, he is a fair subject upon which to test the thesis of Dean Pound-that
in a civilized society it is the duty of the judge to evaluate competing interests
in the light of the social needs of the time and place. Social interests are
not the paramount interests, but important interests nevertheless, to be con-
sidered with individual and public interests. The law, then, is not the subject
of arbitrary change or the victim of the prepossessions of another age,
mechanically repeated in the name of Justice.
